MISSION

LINEAGE
90th Pursuit Squadron (Interceptor) constituted, 13 Jan 1942
Activated, 9 Feb 1942
Redesignated 90th Fighter Squadron, 15 May 1942
Redesignated 90th Fighter Squadron (Single Engine), 1 Jul 1942
Redesignated 90th Fighter Squadron, Single Engine, 28 Feb 1944
Inactivated, 3 Nov 1945
Redesignated 90th Flying Training Squadron, 25 May 1972
Activated, 1 Jan 1973

STATIONS
Selfridge Field, MI, 9 Feb 1942
Newark, NJ, 24 Jun 1942
La Guardia Aprt, NY, 27 Aug 1942
Mitchel Field, NY, 27 Feb–30 Apr 1943
Karachi, India, 28 Jun 1943
Jorhat, India, 12 Sep 1943
Moran, India, Mar 1944
Tingkawk Sakan, Burma, 27 Aug 1944
Myitkyina, Burma, 21 Jan 1945
Moran, India, 5 May 1945
Dudhkundi, India, 30 May–6 Oct 1945
Camp Kilmer, NJ, 1–3 Nov 1945
Sheppard AFB, TX, 1 Jan 1973
ASSIGNMENTS
80th Pursuit (later, 80th Fighter) Group, 9 Feb 1942–3 Nov 1945
80th Flying Training Wing, 1 Jan 1973
80 Operations Group, 2 Jan 1998

WEAPON SYSTEMS
P–47, 1942–1943
P–40, 1943–1944
P-40K
P-40N
P–47, 1944–1945
P-47B
P-47C
P-47
T–38, 1973
T-38A 1973
T-38C 2006
P-40K
P-40N
P-47B
P-47C
P-47D

COMMANDERS
Unknown, 9 Feb 42-3 Nov 45
LTC George C. Hull, 1 Jan 1973
LTC Timothy L. Thomas, 20 May 1974
LTC Larry L. Dillingham, 11 Nov 1974
LTC George F. Baird, 21 Jun 1976
LTC Johnny C. Fender, 1 Apr 1977
LTC Eric S. Doten, 31 Mar 1978
LTC Ellwood P. Hinman III, 14 May 1979
LTC Theodore M. Duigon, 29 May 1980
LTC Phillip V. Maywald, 17 Apr 1981
LTC Mitchell D. Hopkins, 23 Jun 1981
Maj William R. Bean, Jr., 1 Dec 1981
LTC Henri R. Buffart (RNLAF), 1 Mar 1982
LTC David R. Love, 22 Mar 1985
LTC Daniel T. Fucci, 14 Nov 1986
LTC Gerhard Ballhausen (GAP), 10 Mar 1988
LTC Giuseppe Borgna (ITA), 12 Apr 1991
LTC Luigi Telesca (ITA), 12 Apr 1993
LTC Michael W. Steinfurth, 19 Jul 1996
LTC Patrick R. Demoritier (BAF), 16 Jul 1999
LTC James D. Reed, 16 Jul 2001
LTC John Kreger, 21 Jun 2001
LTC Salvatore Romeo (ITAF), 30 Jun 2004
LTC Harry Oostema (RNLAF), 3 Nov 2006
LTC Oliver Habel (GAF), 10 Apr 2009

**HONORS**

**Service Streamers**
World War II
American Theater

**Campaign Streamers**
World War II
India-Burma
Central Burma

**Armed Forces Expeditionary Streamers**
None

**Decorations**
Distinguished Unit Citation
Assam, India, 27 Mar 1944

Air Force Outstanding Unit Awards
1 Nov 1975–30 Oct 1977
10–20 Apr 1979
30 Apr 1981–29 Apr 1983
1999-30 Jun 2001

**EMBLEM**
On a Yellow disc edged Black, a caricatured, Black and White bear, standing on hind legs, facing toward dexter, wearing Red Brown boxing gloves on the forepaws, and swinging a left uppercut punch, leaving a comet trail of Red, White, and Blue flecked with four, White, five-point stars. The Bear represents the mental and physical strength, and the strength of character demanded of every pilot instructor of the squadron. The uppercut symbolizes the aggressiveness with which each instructor pilot attacks his duties. The four stars represent the four disciplines each instructor pilot must master, and in turn, convey to the student pilots: knowledge, skill, motivation, and dedication. (Approved, 19 Jan 1945; modified, 18 Jul 1995)

MOTTO

NICKNAME

OPERATIONS

Aerial Victory Credits
Flying Officer Samuel E. Hammer, 27 Mar 1944
ILt Samuel E. Hammer, 14 Dec 1944
2Lt Steadman L. Howarth, 14 Dec 1944
2Lt Gale H. Lyon, 27 Mar 1944
2Lt Joseph B Patton, 27 Mar 1944
1 Lt Ralph E. Wood Jr., 27 Mar 1944

Maj. Brad Funk, 35, an instructor pilot, and 2nd Lt. Alec Littler, 23, a student pilot, were killed May 1 when their T-38C aircraft crashed on approach during a training flight at Sheppard AFB, Tex. Funk was with the base's 90th Flying Training Squadron, while Littler was enrolled in the 80th Flying Training Wing's Euro-NATO joint jet pilot training program. 2008

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION T-38, SERIAL NUMBER (S/N) 66-4323 AND T-38, S/N 64-13290 90th FLYING TRAINING SQUADRON (FTS), SHEPPARD AIR FORCE BASE, TX
On 24 August, 2001, at approximately 1605 Central Daylight Time (CDT), T-38 S/N 66-4323 (MAI) and T-38 S/N 64-13290 (MA2) collided in flight and crashed approximately 59 miles west of Sheppard AFB, TX. The crew of MAI was a solo Italian student pilot (MSP1). MSP1 sustained instantaneous fatal injuries during collision. The crew of MA2 consisted of an Italian instructor pilot (MIP), and an Italian student pilot (MSP2). MIP and MSP2 successfully ejected from their aircraft after the collision and were picked up immediately. The mishap aircraft were number 1 and 2 respectively in a 2-ship formation sortie. The solo student (MSP1) was in the lead position throughout the entire flight. The sequence of events from pre-flight up to collision was normal. The flight entered the working airspace and accomplished the following routine maneuvers: pitchout and rejoin, fingertip maneuvering, close trail, and then began to maneuver in fighting wing. During fighting wing maneuvers, the student in the dual aircraft (MSP2) flew to position at the right 3 to 4 o’clock position of lead, resulting in the requirement to adjust his flight path (lag) in order to maintain proper position within the “cone”. The combination of this lag maneuver to the left and lead’s entry into a right hand barrel roll maneuver, put the flight into a situation where lead was in the sun relative to number 2. The MIP asked his student if he had sight of lead. MSP2 replied that he had lead in sight. Uncertain that the student could correctly assess angle-off and closure, the IP took control of the aircraft and initiated a negative g maneuver. Simultaneously with this maneuver, both IP and student testified that they saw a shadow or shape off to the right and slightly high, followed immediately by the collision. MA2’s vertical tail collided with the left fuselage and cockpit area of MAI. Seconds after the collision, the MIP sensed that MA2 was not controllable and ordered bailout. Bailout procedures were executed perfectly, and both MIP and MSP2 ejected successfully. Evidence indicates that the solo student (MSP1) sustained instantaneous fatal injuries in the collision and therefore could not attempt ejection. Both aircraft crashed in fields and were destroyed. There is clear and convincing evidence that three causal factors contributed to this accident. First, none of the three involved crewmembers were able to correctly assess angle-off and closure in time to avoid a collision. For the crew of MA2, the reason involved momentary blindness as MAI went in line with the sun. For MSP1, it appears that he lost situational awareness with his wingman during this phase. Second, the MIP did not anticipate the sequence of maneuvers which placed the lead in the sun and allowed an uncomfortable situation to mature. His student told him that he had lead in sight, but the MIP was not ultimately convinced that his student was correctly assessing the situation. He took the aircraft and initiated corrective action, but it was too late. Third, the lead pilot (MSP1) was not aware that his sequence of maneuvers resulted in a situation where he was in the sun relative to his wingman and he was not monitoring his wingman during this phase of flight. This accident could have been avoided if any one of these factors had been different.

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION T-38A, S/N 66-8368 80th FLYING TRAINING WING, SHEPPARD AFB, TX

On 14 October 2003, at 1055 local time, the mishap aircraft (MA), a T-38A, S/N 66-8368, crashed during initial takeoff on Runway 33C at Sheppard AFB, TX. The MA was assigned to the 90th Flying Training Squadron, 80th Flying Training Wing, Sheppard AFB, TX, and was part of the Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training program. The Mishap Instructor Pilot (MIP) and Mishap Student Pilot (MSP), both from the 80th Operations Support Squadron, ejected safely and sustained no injuries. The MA was destroyed. There was no other significant
property damage or injury. Immediately after liftoff, the MA experienced a series of rolls that increased in magnitude and rate. Liftoff occurred slightly early, at approximately 155 knots. The MA experienced an aerodynamic disturbance (characterized as wing “dips”) at bank angles of less than 20 degrees. The sequence continued with a left roll to approximately 30-45 degrees and then a right roll to approximately 40-50 degrees. The MIP came on the controls at that point to try and arrest the rolls by neutralizing the stick with slight forward pressure. The MA rolled again to a left bank of approximately 50-60 degrees and back to the right to 60-70 degrees. At that point, the MIP decided the MA was not responding to his control inputs and he commanded ejection. The MA rolled once again back to the left and the MIP ejected from the aircraft as it was in approximately 45 degrees of left bank. The MSP purposefully delayed ejection to obtain a more favorable aircraft attitude for ejection. The MA rolled back to the right after reaching approximately 90 degrees of left bank. The MSP ejected very shortly after the left wingtip contacted the runway in 35-40 degrees of left bank. The entire sequence occurred at less than 100 feet above ground level. The MA impacted and then departed Runway 33C and came to rest on the departure end of Runway 33L, facing southeast. The Board could not determine a mishap cause by clear and convincing evidence, however, there was substantial evidence to support two contributing factors: Inexperience of the MSP, and improper transfer of aircraft control between the MSP and the MIP during the mishap sequence. Due to inexperience, the MSP most likely over-controlled the roll of the MA in response to an aerodynamic disturbance immediately after liftoff. The over-controlling likely continued until the MIP came on the controls and stated, “I have the aircraft.” However, the MSP did not hear the MIP’s statement and continued to make aileron inputs. The MIP neutralized the stick but never confirmed that the MSP relinquished control, leading to a situation where both pilots were on the controls, neither aware of the other. The MA continued rolling and the MIP perceived that the MA was not responding to his flight control inputs. Given the critical phase of flight and the perception that the MA was uncontrollable, the MIP commanded ejection.

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION T-38C, SERIAL NUMBER (S/N) 64-3231 90TH FLYING TRAINING SQUADRON (FTS), SHEPPARD AIR FORCE BASE (AFB), TEXAS On 1 May 2008, at 0752 Local Time (L), the Mishap Aircraft (MA), a T-38C Talon S/N 64-3231, crashed approximately 6800 feet down the runway between runways 15C and 15R at Sheppard AFB, Texas (TX). The MA, assigned to the 90 FTS. 80th Operations Group (80 OG), 80th Flying Training Wing (80 FTW), was on a student training sortie. The Mishap Crew (VIC), consisting of a Mishap Instructor Pilot (MIP) assigned to the 90 FTS and a Mishap Student Pilot (MSP) assigned to the 80th Operations Support Squadron (80 OSS), were fatally injured in the mishap. The MSP flew a simulated single engine heavyweight (full fuel load) approach with an alternate gear extension without the Heads Up Display (HUD) for a planned touch and go to runway 15C. At or near the time the MA touched down, the MIP took control of the aircraft because the aircraft was outside the parameters for a successful landing on the main runway surface. The MA made a firm landing in the overrun, throwing debris from the overrun surface into the number 2 (right) engine intake resulting in compressor stall two seconds after touchdown and complete engine seizure four seconds after touchdown.
Eight seconds after the right engine failed, while climbing away from the ground the MIP retracted the landing gear and flaps. Eleven seconds after the engine failed, the MIP selected maximum power (MAX) on the left engine. The proper procedure following an engine failure during either the takeoff or landing phase is to immediately select MAX power, set flaps to 60 percent and attain safe flying airspeed. The lack of power and airspeed, and the MIP’s failure to leave the flaps positioned at 60 percent, resulted in a high angle of attack and subsequent stall. The MC ejected 24 seconds after engine failure. At the time of ejection, the aircraft was 5-10 degrees nose low, 25-40 feet above the ground and in a fully developed stall. The near simultaneous ejection of the MC caused contact between the two ejection seats, disrupted their trajectories, and resulted in an unsuccessful ejection sequence. Both pilots were fatally injured upon impacting the ground. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair with a loss of $8,507,567.01. No private property was damaged. Clear and convincing evidence reveals that the cause of this accident was the MIP’s failure to execute the critical emergency procedures upon right engine failure two seconds after touching down in the overrun.

Sources
The Institute of Heraldry. U.S. Army. Fort Belvoir, VA.