

4 FIGHTER SQUADRON



MISSION

LINEAGE

4 Pursuit Squadron (Interceptor) constituted 20 Nov 1940
Activated, 15 Jan 1941
Redesignated 4 Fighter Squadron, 15 May 1942
Redesignated 4 Fighter Squadron, Single-Engine, 20 Aug 1943
Inactivated, 7 Nov 1945
Redesignated 4 Fighter Squadron (All Weather), 19 Dec 1946
Activated, 20 Feb 1947
Redesignated 4 Fighter Squadron, All Weather, 10 Aug 1948
Redesignated 4 Fighter All Weather Squadron, 20 Jan 1950
Redesignated 4 Fighter Interceptor Squadron, 25 Apr 1951
Redesignated 4 Tactical Fighter Squadron, 20 Jun 1965
Redesignated 4 Fighter Squadron, 1 Nov 1991

STATIONS

Selfridge Field, MI, 15 Jan 1941
Langley Field, VA, 17 Dec 1941
Selfridge Field, MI, 14 Jan 1942
Florence, SC, 18 Feb 1942
Wilmington, NC, 27 Apr 1942

Grenier Field, NH, 12 Jun–19 Jul 1942
Northern Ireland, 19 Aug 1942
Goxhill, England, 25 Aug–29 Oct 1942 (air echelon arrived at Tafaraoui, Algeria, on 8 Nov 1942)
La Senia, Algeria, 12 Nov 1942
Orleansville, Algeria, 1 Jan 1943
Telergma, Algeria, 19 Jan 1943
Youks-les-Bains, Algeria, 8 Mar 1943
Le Sers, Tunisia, 12 Apr 1943
La Sebala, Tunisia, 20 May 1943
Boccadifalco, Sicily, 1 Aug 1943
Corsica, 4 Dec 1943
Madna Airfield, Italy, 14 May 1944
Piagiolino Airfield, Italy, 24 Apr 1945
Lesina, Italy, 10 Jul–Aug 1945
Drew Field, FL, 25 Aug–7 Nov 1945
Yontan AB, Okinawa, 20 Feb 1947
Naha AB, Okinawa, 19 Aug 1948
Kadena AB, Okinawa, 16 Feb 1953
Naha AB, Okinawa, 25 Feb 1954
Misawa AB, Japan, 1 Aug 1954–15 Jun 1965
Eglin AFB, FL, 20 Jun 1965–9 Apr 1969
Da Nang AB, South Vietnam, 12 Apr 1969
Takhli RTAFB, Thailand, 27 Jun 1972
Udorn RTAFB, Thailand, 31 Oct 1972–23 Dec 1975
Hill AFB, UT, 23 Dec 1975

DEPLOYED STATIONS

Central AB, Al Minhad, United Arab Emirates, 28 Aug 1990–27 Mar 1991

ASSIGNMENTS

52 Pursuit (later, 52 Fighter) Group, 15 Jan 1941–7 Nov 1945
347 Fighter Group, 20 Feb 1947
Twentieth Air Force, 24 Jun 1950
Japan Air Defense Force, 10 Aug 1954
Fifth Air Force, 1 Sep 1954
39 Air Division, 1 Mar 1955
33 Tactical Fighter Wing, 20 Jun 1965
366 Tactical Fighter Wing, 12 Apr 1969
432 Tactical Reconnaissance (later, 432 Tactical Fighter) Wing, 31 Oct 1972
388 Tactical Fighter (later, 388 Fighter) Wing, 23 Dec 1975, 28 Aug 1990–27 Mar 1991
388 Operations Group, 1 Dec 1991

ATTACHMENTS

51 Fighter [later, 51 Fighter-Interceptor] Group), 20 Feb 1947–24 Jun 1950
6302 Air Base Group, 20 Sep 1950–24 Jun 1951
6351 Air Base Wing, 25 Jun 1951–unkn
39 Air Division, 10 Aug 1954
388 Tactical Fighter Wing (Deployed) [later, 388 Tactical Fighter Wing (Provisional)]

WEAPON SYSTEMS

P-40, 1941–1942
P-39, 1942
Spitfire V, 1942
P-51, 1944
F-61, 1947–1950
F-82, 1949–1952
F-94, 1951–1954
F-86, 1954–1960
F-102, 1960–1965
F-4, **1965–1967, 1967–1975, 1976–1980**
F-16

COMMANDERS

HONORS

Service Streamers

Korean Theater

Campaign Streamers

World War II
Air Offensive, Europe
Algeria-French Morocco
Tunisia
Sicily
Naples-Foggia
Rome-Arno
Normandy
Northern France
Southern France
North Apennines
Rhineland
Central Europe
Po Valley
Air Combat, EAME Theater

Vietnam

TET 69/Counteroffensive
Vietnam Summer-Fall, 1969
Vietnam Winter-Spring, 1970
Sanctuary Counteroffensive
Southwest Monsoon
Commando Hunt V
Commando Hunt VI
Commando Hunt VII
Vietnam Ceasefire

Southwest Asia
Defense of Saudi Arabia
Liberation and Defense of Kuwait

Armed Forces Expeditionary Streamers

Decorations

Distinguished Unit Citations
Germany, 9 Jun 1944
Rumania, 31 Aug 1944

Presidential Unit Citation
Southeast Asia, 1 Apr–26 Jun 1972

Air Force Outstanding Unit Awards with Combat "V" Device
[12 Apr 1969]–31 Jul 1969
1 Aug 1969–1 Aug 1970
2 Aug 1970–31 Mar 1972
18 Dec 1972–27 Jan 1973

Air Force Outstanding Unit Awards
1 Jul 1967–20 Jun 1968
1 Jul 1968–9 Apr 1969

Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross with Palm
[12 Apr 1969]–28 Jan 1973

EMBLEM



4 Fighter All-Weather Squadron



4 Fighter Interceptor Squadron





4 Fighter Squadron emblem: At the center of a Black disc, Fuujin, the Okinawan god of wind, Green, carrying a large Yellow sack, wearing a Red scarf draped about the neck and shoulders,

all in front of a White thunder cloud outlined Gray with Yellow lightning flash issuing toward dexter base. (Approved, 25 Feb 1949, and slightly modified, 1994)

MOTTO

Fighting Fuujins

OPERATIONS

As part of the world's largest LANTIRN F-16 wing, the 4 FS conducts flying operations and equipment maintenance to maintain combat readiness of an 18-aircraft F-16C Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night (LANTIRN) squadron. It prepares to deploy worldwide to conduct air-to-air and air-to-ground operations for daylight and nighttime missions.

Combat in ETO and MTO, Aug 1942–30 Apr 1945. The 4 destroyed 109 enemy aircraft in aerial combat and produced three aces during World War II.

The unit was assigned to Naha Air Base, Japan, in 1948 when it was redesignated as the 4 Fighter Squadron (All Weather). It was there that the squadron adopted the Fuujin, the Okinawan god of wind, as its emblem after half of its combat aircraft were destroyed by a freak windstorm.

Air defense of the Ryukyus during the Korean War.

Trained Japanese Self-Defense Force, Korean and Thai Air Forces pilots, Aug 1954–Jun 1965.

A major problem for the 4 FIS at Naha was that of corrosion. Five of their F-94s being damaged through salt spray from wind storms or simply the heavy salt content in the air over the island of Okinawa. By the end of 1954 the problem had been resolved by returning all of the aircraft but one to the United States and replacing them with F-86Ds.

Claiming the last USAF victory on 8 January 1973 (a MiG-21 brought down by Cpt. P. D. Howman and 1Lt. L. K. Kullman of the 4 TFS/432nd TRW)

Combat in Southeast Asia, 3 Jun 1969–15 Aug 1973. The 4 TFS downed four enemy aircraft in combat over Vietnam. One of the 4's aircrews earned the last USAF aerial victory of the war by downing a MiG-21 on 8 Jan 1973.

Combat air cover for the evacuations of Phnom Penh, Cambodia, and Saigon, Vietnam, Apr 1975. Air cover during the recovery of the SS Mayaguez and its crew, May 1975.

Combat in Southwest Asia, Jan–Feb 1991.

On 17 October 2001, at 2116 Mountain Time, 0416 Universal Coordinated Time, an F-16CG,

serial number 88-0533, departed the right side of Runway 32 after an aborted takeoff. The mishap aircraft (MA), assigned to the 388th Fighter Wing, 4 Fighter Squadron, at Hill Air Force Base, Utah, was part of a night, two aircraft (“two-ship”) flight lead upgrade mission. There were no civilian injuries and only minor injuries sustained by the mishap pilot (MP). The F-16 sustained over \$10,000,000 in damage. During the takeoff roll the nose tire of the MA failed catastrophically. Analysis of the tire remains concluded the most likely cause was staking an object on the runway at high speed. As the nose tire disintegrated, it severed several critical wires on the nose gear assembly and damaged another vital component, rendering the nosewheel steering inoperative. This significantly reduced the MP’s ability to steer the F-16. The MP noted an explosion, a column of flame on the left side of the canopy, and some deceleration and elected to abort the takeoff. He correctly applied abort procedures in an effort to stop the MA. Approximately eleven seconds after initiating the abort the MA veered to the right but the MP was unable to maintain directional control. When it became evident, the aircraft would depart the runway the MP successfully ejected. The MA continued off the prepared surface, across an unused taxiway, and came to a full stop after catching the right wingtip in the soft ground. The primary cause of the mishap, supported by clear and convincing evidence, was a phenomenon known as reverse castering. After the tire failed the nosewheel ground down to a smaller radius. The new geometry forced the point of contact between the wheel and the runway to move forward of the nose landing gear strut axis, causing the nose wheel to caster in the direction opposite the direction the MP was attempting to move the aircraft. In this case the pilot was applying controls to return the MA to the left, which forced the nosewheel further to the right. As the aircraft slowed and the rudder became less effective, the MP lost sufficient authority from differential braking to counteract the effect of reverse castering. The MP made every reasonable effort, to maintain control of his aircraft, but the combination of the loss of nosewheel steering and the forces generated by the reverse castering exceeded his ability to keep the MA on the runway. The F-16 is inherently unstable on an unprepared surface at high speed; therefore the MP’s decision to eject was prudent and proper.

On 25 October 2002, at 1445L, F-16CG Serial Number (S/N) 89-2006, Mishap Aircraft 1 (MA1), callsign BANZAI 1, collided in midair with F-16CG S/N 89-2111, MA2, callsign BANZAI 4, approximately 82 miles southwest of Hill AFB, UT, within the confines of the Utah Training and Test Range (UTTR). Both aircraft, assigned to the 4 Fighter Squadron, 388th Fighter Wing, Hill AFB, were participating in a 4-aircraft versus 4-aircraft (4v4) Air Combat Tactics (ACT) mission as part of an Instructor Pilot Upgrade (IPUG) sortie for Mishap Pilot 1 (MP1), BANZAI 1. MP1 ejected safely and suffered no injuries. MP2, BANZAI 4, was extracted from his aircraft and fatally injured. Both aircraft were destroyed with no property damage or injuries to civilians. The mishap mission was the second engagement on the second sortie of the day for BANZAI 1-4 and BEAK 1-4, with BEAK flight simulating Red Air (adversary) aircraft. The engagement began with BEAK flight in the southern part of the training area and BANZAI flight in the northern part, with about 50 Nautical Miles (NM) of separation. Prior to the engagement, MP1 directed the elements to swap wingmen in order to balance simulated weapons loads. BANZAI flight left the CAP heading south as a four-ship with MP1 and MP2 paired together on the west side of the formation. BEAK flight departed from the south in two elements (east and west groups)

separated by a distance of approximately 12 NM. MP1 directed the wingmen to target their respective groups, and MP2 took his simulated missile shot at the western group. Without looking to see where his wingman was, MP1 directed his element to reference heading 210 degrees, and began a 1.7G right turn to 210 degrees. At that moment, MP2 was only flying 2,500 feet away from his flight lead, approximately 7 degrees back, and slightly lower. MP2 began a left turn into the direction of MP1 to reposition to the other side of the formation. Approximately three seconds prior to impact, MP2 recognized that he was on a collision course with MAI and abruptly pushed full forward on the control stick in a last ditch effort to fly under MAI. The two aircraft impacted left wing to left wing in a descent at approximately 32,000 Mean Sea Level (MSL). There is clear and convincing evidence this mishap was caused by the failure of both MP1 and MP2 to properly deconflict their flight paths during a tactical turn. Other contributing factors included: loss of situational awareness; misinterpretation of closure and visual cues, task misprioritization and channelization, and expectancy.

On 18 December 2002, at approximately 2121 Mountain Standard Time (MST), two F-16CG's assigned to the 4 FS, 388th FW, Hill AFB, UT, collided approximately 38 Nautical Miles (NM) northwest of Hill AFB during a night radar assisted trail recovery. The mishap aircraft (MA) were flying in the second element as #3 and #4 of a four-ship night vision goggle syllabus upgrade sortie. During the recovery, #4 (Mishap Pilot (MP) 2) obtained an undetected 110 knots (approximately 126 miles per hour) closure on #3 (MP1). Failing to recognize this closure until seconds prior to impact, MP2 collided with the lead aircraft (MAI), passing underneath and slightly to the left. After a brief discussion, MP1 assessed that a close pass rather than a midair collision had occurred, thus normal recovery procedures were continued to full stop landings. Impact damage to both aircraft was identified by the ground recovery crew, who shut down the MA in the de-arm area. During recovery to Hill AFB from the Utah Test and Training Range (UTTR), MP1 directed MP2 to maneuver his aircraft behind MAI and "call when established at 1.5 nautical miles." MP2 maneuvered 1 NM behind MAI and called "saddled," a term indicating he was established at the proper position. While coordinating maintenance codes to notify ground crew of aircraft problems, MP2 called "code 3 for VVF" (vertical velocity indicator—the aircraft instrument that depicts rate of climb or dive). An exhaustive dialogue ensued between MP1 and MP2 over the next 52 seconds to specify the exact nature of MA2's system degradation. During the discussion, MP2 channelized his attention on the failed VVI and ceased to engage in the proper crosscheck procedure both inside and outside the cockpit. MP2 allowed his airspeed to increase 88 knots above the briefed standard, resulting in significant closure and eventual impact with his flight leader. Seconds prior to impact, at approximately 300 feet, MP2 looked up, saw MAI, and initiated a 0.7 G pushover bunt and 40 degree roll to the left. The majority of damage to MAI was to the right and left ventral fins and the Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) pod. The majority of damage to MA2 was confined to the right Captive Air Training Missile (CATM) 120, the right wing tip, and the right leading-edge flaperon. The primary cause of this mishap, supported by clear and convincing evidence, was MP2's failure to prioritize his responsibilities while performing a routine night recovery. He channelized his attention on analysis of the failed VVI and ceased all remaining crosscheck procedures required to maintain his formation position. Two additional factors, supported by substantial evidence, contributed to the mishap by combining to reduce the time and distance between MAI and

MA2 during the recovery mishap sequence. First, MP2 failed to achieve the briefed range of 1.5 NM during the recovery, contributing to reduced separation between MA1 and MA2. Second, MP1 failed to fly contracted airspeeds during recovery, slowing 23 knots below the briefed airspeed, thus contributing to the 110 knots of relative closure between MA1 and MA2.

On 8 October 2010, at 1717 local time, an F-16CM, Tail Number 89-2144, crashed after landing at Bagram Air Field (BAF), Afghanistan. The Mishap Pilot (MP) was unable to stop the Mishap Aircraft (MA) and departed the runway, traveling 1500 feet before coming to rest in a perimeter fence. After stopping, the MP egressed the MA unharmed. The MA is assigned to the 4 Fighter Squadron, 388th Fighter Wing, Hill Air Force Base, Utah. The MP was leading a flight of two F-16s on a Close Air Support mission supporting Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. After an uneventful mission, the MP flew back to BAF to land. Strong crosswinds were observed that were near the limit for the F-16, creating the possibility that the MP might have to divert to another airfield. Per standards, the MP had to carry and land with additional fuel in case of the need to divert from BAF to an alternate airfield for landing. When the MP arrived at BAF, the crosswinds were within limits for landing. The MP elected to land with 2200 pounds of fuel over the amount required to divert to an alternate airfield. The MP touched down approximately 2000 feet down the runway. When the MP lowered the nose to the runway and applied the brakes, the left brake did not work, resulting in difficulty slowing the MA down and maintaining a position in the middle of the runway. The MP started running the checklist for brake failure, including lowering the arresting hook. The hook failed to engage the arresting cable strung across the runway. After the MA passed the arresting cable, the MP shut the engine off as the MA departed the runway. The MA continued 1500 feet across a dirt field and the landing gear collapsed as the MA struck an elevated paved road. The MA came to rest in a chain link fence and suffered extensive damage to several bulkheads, air-to-air missiles, and the Sniper targeting pod was destroyed. The total cost of the mishap is \$4,868,575. The Accident Investigation Board (AIB) President found by clear and convincing evidence the causes of this mishap were failure of the left wheel brake and the MP's decision to land with excess fuel beyond the desired touchdown point. These factors combined to yield a situation where the MP had insufficient time to react to the brake failure and complete the brake failure checklist before departing the end of the runway at a high speed. I find by clear and convincing evidence the causes of this mishap were failure of the left wheel brake of the mishap aircraft (MA) and the mishap pilot's (MP) decision to accept a landing past the desired touchdown point with excess fuel weight. These factors combined to yield a situation where the MP had insufficient time to analyze the brake failure and complete the brake failure checklist before departing the end of the runway at a high speed. The MP was leading a flight of two F-16s on a Close Air Support mission supporting Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. After an uneventful mission, the MP flew back to Bagram Air Field (BAF) to land. Strong crosswinds were observed that were near the limit for the F-16, creating the possibility that the MP might have to divert to another airfield. Per standards, the MP had to carry and land with additional fuel in case of the need to divert from BAF to an alternate airfield for landing. When the MP arrived at BAF, the crosswinds were within limits for landing. The MP elected to land with 2200 pounds of fuel over the amount required to divert to an alternate airfield. The MP touched down approximately 2000 feet down the runway. When the MP lowered the nose to the runway and applied the brakes,

the left brake did not work, resulting in difficulty slowing the MA down and maintaining a position in the middle of the runway. The MP started running the checklist for brake failure, including switching brake channels and lowering the arresting hook. The hook failed to engage the arresting cable strung across the runway. After the MA passed the arresting cable, the MP shut the engine off as the MA departed the runway. The MA continued 1500 feet across a dirt field and the landing gear collapsed as the MA struck an elevated paved road. The MA came to rest in a chain link fence and suffered extensive damage to several bulkheads, air-to-air missiles, and the Sniper targeting pod was destroyed. I developed my opinion by analyzing factual data from historical records, guidance and directives, engineering analysis, witness testimony, and information provided by technical experts. I used the MP testimony in conjunction with information downloaded from the anti-skid control box and the Crash Survivable Flight Data Recorder to determine the mishap sequence of events.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE UNIT HISTORIES

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Sources

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Air Force News. Air Force Public Affairs Agency.

USAF Accident Investigation Board Reports.